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Anoosheh Heidarzadeh, Fatemeh Kazemi, and Alex Sprintson
Abstract—We study the problem of single-server single-
message Private Information Retrieval with Private Coded Side
Information (PIR-PCSI). In this problem, there is a server
that stores a database, and a user who knows a random
linear combination of a random subset of messages in the
database. The number of messages contributing to the user’s
side information is known to the server a priori, whereas their
indices and coefficients are unknown to the server a priori.
The user wants to retrieve a message from the server (with
minimum download cost), while protecting the identities of both
the demand and side information messages.
Depending on whether the demand is part of the coded
side information or not, we consider two different models for
the problem. For the model in which the demand does not
contribute to the side information, we prove a lower bound on
the minimum download cost for all (linear and non-linear) PIR
protocols; and for the other model wherein the demand is one
of the messages contributing to the side information, we prove a
lower bound for all scalar-linear PIR protocols. In addition, we
propose novel PIR protocols that achieve these lower bounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the information-theoretic Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) problem (see, e.g., [1], [2]), there is a user that wishes
to download a single or multiple messages belonging to a
database stored on a single or multiple (non-colluding or
colluding) servers. The goal of the user is to minimize the
download cost (i.e., the amount of information downloaded
from the server(s)), while hiding the identity of its demanded
message(s) from the server(s). This setup was recently ex-
tended in [3]–[12] to the settings wherein the user has some
side information about the messages in the database, and the
side information is unknown to the server(s).
For the single-server setting of the PIR problem in the
presence of some side information, we studied the cases in
which the side information is a random subset of messages
(a.k.a. PIR with Side Information (PIR-SI)) or a random
linear combination of a random subset of messages (a.k.a.
PIR with Coded Side Information (PIR-CSI)) in [3], [11]
and [9], respectively. The multi-server setting of the PIR-
SI problem was also studied in [7], [8], [10]. For the PIR-SI
problem, two different types of privacy, known asW -privacy
(i.e., only the identities of the demand messages must be
protected) and (W,S)-privacy (i.e., the identities of both the
demand and side information messages must be protected
jointly) have been considered, whereas the problem of PIR-
CSI has only been studied when W -privacy is required.
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In this work, we study the single-server single-message
PIR-CSI problem where (W,S)-privacy is required. In this
problem, referred to as PIR with Private Coded Side Informa-
tion (PIR-PCSI), there is a single server storing a database of
K messages, and there is a user who knows a random linear
combination of a random subset ofM messages. This setting
can be motivated by several practical scenarios. The user
may have obtained their side information via overhearing in
a wireless network; or from a trusted server with limited
knowledge about the database; or from the information
locally stored in the user’s cache of limited size, to name a
few. The user is interested in downloading a single message
from the server while preserving the privacy of both the
demand message and the messages contributing to the side
information. Depending on whether the user’s demanded
message itself contributes to the user’s side information or
not, we consider two different models of the PIR-PCSI
problem.
A. Main Contributions
For the model in which the demanded message is not part
of the coded side information, we characterize the capacity
and the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-PCSI problem,
where the (scalar-linear) capacity is defined as the supremum
of all achievable rates (i.e., the inverse of the download cost)
for all (scalar-linear) protocols. In particular, we show that
for this model the capacity and the scalar-linear capacity
are both equal to (K − M)−1 for any 0 ≤M ≤ K − 1.
This is interesting because, as shown in [3, Theorem 2],
even when the user knows M (uncoded) messages as their
side information, in order to guarantee (W,S)-privacy, the
minimum download cost is K − M . This shows that for
achieving (W,S)-privacy there will be no loss in capacity
even if only one linear combination of M messages (instead
of M messages separately) is known to the user a priori.
For the model wherein the user’s demanded message
contributes to their coded side information, we show that the
scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-PCSI problem is equal to
(K−M+1)−1 for any 2 ≤M ≤ K . Interestingly, this result
shows that when the user knows M − 1 messages (different
from the demand), achieving (W,S)-privacy is as costly as
that when the user knows only one linear combination of the
M − 1 messages and the demand.
The converse proofs are based on information-theoretic
arguments, and the proofs of achievability rely on novel PIR
protocols based on the Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS)
codes that include a specific codeword.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let Fq be a finite field of size q, and let Fqm be an
extension field of Fq for some integer m. Let L , m log2 q,
and let F×q , Fq \ {0}. For a positive integer i, we denote
{1, . . . , i} by [i]. Let K ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ M ≤ K be two
integers. We denote the set of all subsets of K , [K] of
size M by S, and the set of all sequences of length M with
elements from F×q by C.
Assume that there is a server that stores a set of
K messages X1, . . . , XK , with each message Xi being
independently and uniformly distributed over Fqm , i.e.,
H(X1) = · · · = H(XK) = L and H(X1, . . . , XK) = KL.
Also assume that there is a user that wishes to retrieve
a message XW from the server for some W ∈ K, and
knows a linear combination Y [S,C] ,
∑
i∈S ciXi for some
S , {i1, . . . , iM} ∈ S and C , {ci1 , . . . , ciM } ∈ C. We
refer to W as the demand index, XW as the demand, S as
the side information index set, Y [S,C] as the side information,
and M as the side information size.
We denote by S, C , and W the random variables rep-
resenting S, C, and W , respectively. We also denote the
probability mass function (PMF) of S by pS(·), the PMF
of C by pC(·), and the conditional PMF of W given S by
pW |S(·|·). We assume that S is uniformly distributed over
S, i.e., pS(S) =
(
K
M
)−1
for all S ∈ S; and C is uniformly
distributed over C, i.e., pC(C) = (q − 1)−M for all C ∈ C.
Also, we consider two different models for the conditional
PMF of W given S = S as follows:
Model I: W is uniformly distributed over K \ S, i.e.,
pW |S(W |S) =
{
(K −M)−1, W 6∈ S,
0, otherwise.
Model II: W is uniformly distributed over S, i.e.,
pW |S(W |S) =
{
M−1, W ∈ S,
0, otherwise;
To avoid the degenerate cases, we assume 0 ≤M ≤ K − 1
and 2 ≤M ≤ K for the models I and II, respectively.
Let I [W,S] be an indicator function such that I [W,S] = 1
if W ∈ S, and I [W,S] = 0 if W 6∈ S. Note that P(W =
W ′,S = S′|I [W,S] = 0) is equal to (K −M)−1
(
K
M
)−1
if
W ′ 6∈ S′, and it is zero otherwise; and P(W = W ′,S =
S′|I [W,S] = 1) is equal to M−1
(
K
M
)−1
if W ′ ∈ S′, and it is
zero otherwise.
We assume that I [W,S] is known to the server a priori.
We also assume that the server knows the size of S (i.e.,
M ) and the PMF’s pS(·), pC(·), and pW |S(·|·), whereas the
realizations S, C, andW are unknown to the server a priori.
For any S, C, and W , in order to retrieve XW , the user
sends to the server a query Q[W,S,C], which is a (potentially
stochastic) function of W , S, C, and Y [S,C]. The query
Q[W,S,C] must protect the privacy of both the user’s demand
index W and side information index set S from the server’s
perspective, i.e., for any given θ ∈ {0, 1},
P(W = W ′,S = S′|Q[W,S,C], I [W,S] = θ)
= P(W =W ′,S = S′|I [W,S] = θ)
for all W ′ ∈ K and all S′ ∈ S. We refer to this condition as
the (W,S)-privacy condition. Note that the (W,S)-privacy
condition is stronger than the W -privacy condition being
previously studied in [9], where the query must protect only
the privacy of the user’s demand index, i.e., for any given
θ ∈ {0, 1}, we have P(W = W ′|Q[W,S,C], I [W,S] = θ) =
P(W = W ′|I [W,S] = θ) for all W ′ ∈ K and all S′ ∈ S.
Upon receiving Q[W,S,C], the server sends to the user an
answer A[W,S,C], which is a (deterministic) function of the
query Q[W,S,C], the indicator I [W,S], and the messages in
X , i.e., H(A[W,S,C]|Q[W,S,C], I [W,S], {Xi}i∈K) = 0. The
answer A[W,S,C] along with the queryQ[W,S,C], the indicator
I [W,S], and the side information Y [S,C] must enable the user
to retrieve the demand XW ,
H(XW |A
[W,S,C], Q[W,S,C], I [W,S], Y [S,C]) = 0.
This condition is referred to as the recoverability condition.
For each model (I or II), the problem is to design a
query Q[W,S,C] and an answer A[W,S,C] for any W , S,
and C that satisfy the privacy and recoverability conditions.
We refer to this problem as single-server single-message
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) with Private Coded Side
Information (PCSI), or PIR-PCSI for short. Specifically, we
refer to the PIR-PCSI problem under the model I as PIR-
PCSI–I, and under the model II as PIR-PCSI–II.
We refer to a collection of Q[W,S,C] and A[W,S,C] (for all
W , S, and C such that I [W,S] = 0 or I [W,S] = 1) which
satisfy the privacy and recoverability conditions as a PIR-
PCSI–I protocol or a PIR-PCSI–II protocol, respectively.
The rate of a PIR-PCSI (–I or –II) protocol is de-
fined as the ratio of the entropy of a message, i.e., L, to
the average entropy of the answer, i.e., H(A[W ,S,C]) =∑
H(A[W,S,C])pW |S(W |S)pS(S)pC(C), where the sum-
mation is over all W , S, and C (such that I [W,S] = 0 or
I [W,S] = 1). The capacity of PIR-PCSI (–I or –II) problem
is defined as the supremum of rates over all PIR-PCSI (–I or
–II) protocols. The supremum of rates over all scalar-linear
PIR-PCSI (–I or –II) protocols, i.e., the answer contains only
scalar-linear combinations of the messages, is defined as the
scalar-linear capacity of PIR-PCSI (–I or –II) problem.
In this work, our goal is to characterize the capacity and
the scalar-linear capacity of the PIR-PCSI–I and PIR-PCSI–
II problems, and to design PIR-PCSI (–I and –II) protocols
that are capacity-achieving.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We present our main results in this section. The capacity
and the scalar-linear capacity of PIR-CSI–I problem are
characterized in Theorem 1, and the scalar-linear capacity
of PIR-CSI–II problem is characterized in Theorem 2. The
proofs are given in Sections IV and V.
Theorem 1. The capacity and the scalar-linear capacity of
PIR-PCSI–I problem with K messages and side information
size 0 ≤M ≤ K − 1 are given by (K −M)−1.
The converse follows directly from the result of [3, Theo-
rem 2], which was proven using an index coding argument,
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for single-server single-message PIR with (uncoded) side
information when (W,S)-privacy is required. In this work,
we provide an alternative proof by upper bounding the rate
of any PIR-PCSI–I protocol using information-theoretic ar-
guments (see Section IV-A). The key component of the proof
is a necessary condition implied by the (W,S)-privacy and
recoverability conditions (see Lemma 1). The achievability
proof relies on a new PIR-PCSI–I protocol, termed the
Specialized GRS Code protocol, based on the Generalized
Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes with a specific codeword, which
achieves the rate (K −M)−1 (see Section IV-B).
Remark 1. It was shown in [3] that when there is a single
server storing K messages, and there is a user that knowsM
(uncoded) messages as their side information and demands
a single message not in their side information, in order
to guarantee the (W,S)-privacy condition, the minimum
download cost isK−M . Surprisingly, this result matches the
result of Theorem 1. This shows that for achieving (W,S)-
privacy there will be no loss in capacity even if only one
linear combination of M messages (instead of M messages
separately) is known to the user a priori.
Remark 2. When W -privacy, which is a weaker notion
of privacy in comparison to (W,S)-privacy, is required
(i.e., only the user’s demand index, and not the user’s side
information index set, must be protected from the server), the
result of [9, Theorem 1] shows that the capacity of single-
server single-message PIR with a coded side information that
does not include the demand (known as the PIR-CSI–I prob-
lem in [9]) is equal to ⌈ K
M+1⌉
−1. Since ⌈ K
M+1⌉ < K−M for
all 1 ≤M ≤ K − 2, the capacity of PIR-PCSI–I is strictly
smaller than that of PIR-CSI–I, as expected. However, for the
two extremal cases of M = 0 and M = K − 1, it follows
that (W,S)-privacy comes at no extra cost than W -privacy.
Theorem 2. The scalar-linear capacity of PIR-PCSI–
II problem with K messages and side information size
2 ≤M ≤ K is given by (K −M + 1)−1.
The converse proof is based on a mixture of algebraic
and information-theoretic arguments (see Section V-A), and
the proof of achievability is based on a modified version of
the Specialized GRS Code protocol which achieves the rate
(K −M + 1)−1 (see Section V-B).
Remark 3. Interestingly, comparing the results of [3, Theo-
rem 2] and Theorem 2, one can see that when the user knows
M − 1 messages (different from the demand) separately,
achieving (W,S)-privacy is as costly as that when the
user’s side information is only one linear combination of
M messages including the demand.
Remark 4. As shown in [9, Theorem 2], when W -privacy
is required, the capacity of single-server single-message PIR
with a coded side information to which the demand message
contributes (known as the PIR-CSI–II problem in [9]) is
equal to 1 for M = 2 and M = K , and is equal to 12
for all 3 ≤M ≤ K − 1. The result of Theorem 2 matches
this result for the cases of M = K and M = K − 1, and
thereby, (W,S)-privacy and W -privacy are attainable at the
same cost. For other cases of M , as expected, achieving
(W,S)-privacy is more costly than achieving W -privacy.
IV. THE PIR-PCSI–I PROBLEM
A. Converse for Theorem 1
Obviously, the capacity of PIR-PCSI–I is upper bounded
by the capacity of PIR with uncoded side information
where (W,S)-privacy is required, which was shown to be
(K −M)−1 in [3] using an index-coding argument, where
M uncoded messages are available at the user as side
information. This proves the converse for Theorem 1. We
present an alternative information-theoretic proof here.
The following result gives a necessary condition for
(W,S)-privacy and recoverability.
Lemma 1. For any θ ∈ {0, 1}, W ∈ K, and S ∈ S where
I [W,S] = θ, and C ∈ C, and anyW ∗ ∈ K and S∗ ∈ S where
I [W
∗,S∗] = θ, there must exist C∗ ∈ C such that
H(XW∗ |A
[W,S,C], Q[W,S,C], I [W,S], Y [S
∗,C∗]) = 0.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by the way of con-
tradiction, and hence omitted.
Lemma 2. For any 0 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, the capacity of PIR-
PCSI–I is upper bounded by (K −M)−1.
Proof: Fix W , S, and C (and accordingly, Y , Y [S,C])
such that I [W,S] = 0, and let Q , Q[W,S,C] and A ,
A[W,S,C] be the user’s query and the server’s answer, re-
spectively, for an arbitrary PIR-PCSI-I protocol. We need to
show that H(A[W ,S,C]) = H(A) ≥ (K −M)L. Similar to
the proof of [9, Theorem 1], it can be shown that
H(A) ≥ H(XW ) +H(A|Q, Y,XW ). (1)
If W ∪ S = K (i.e., M = K − 1), then we have H(A) ≥
H(XW ) = L, as was to be shown. If W ∪ S 6= K, for
any j ∈ K \ (W ∪ S) there exists Cj ∈ C (and accordingly,
Yj , Y
[S,Cj]) such that H(Xj |A,Q, Yj) = 0 (by Lemma 1).
Let I be a maximal subset of K \ (W ∪ S) such that Y
and YI , {Yj}j∈I are linearly independent. (Note that
|I|≤ |S|−1 =M − 1.) Let XI , {Xj}j∈I . Then, we have
H(A|Q, Y,XW ) ≥ H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI)
= H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI)
+H(XI |A,Q, Y,XW , YI) (2)
= H(XI |Q, Y,XW , YI)
+H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI , XI)
= H(XI) +H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI , XI) (3)
where (2) holds because H(Xj |A,Q, Yj) = 0 for all
j ∈ I (by assumption); and (3) holds since XI is inde-
pendent of (Q, Y,XW , YI) (noting that I and W ∪ S are
disjoint). Note also that, by the maximality of I , for any
j ∈ J , K \ (W ∪ S ∪ I), there exists Cj ∈ C (and
accordingly, Yj , Y
[S,Cj], which is linearly dependent on
{Y, YI}) such that H(Xj |A,Q, Yj) = 0, and subsequently,
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H(Xj |A,Q, YI) = 0. (Note that |J |= K −M − 1− |I|.)
Thus, we can write
H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI , XI)
= H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI , XI)
+H(XJ |A,Q, Y,XW , YI , XI) (4)
= H(XJ |Q, Y,XW , YI , XI)
+H(A|Q, Y,XW , YI , XI , XJ)
≥ H(XJ ) (5)
where (4) holds since H(Xj |A,Q, YI) = 0 for all
j ∈ J (by assumption); and (5) holds because XJ and
(Q, Y,XW , YI , XI) are independent (noting that J and
W ∪ S ∪ I are disjoint). Putting (1), (2), (3), and (5) to-
gether, it follows thatH(A) ≥ H(XW )+H(XI)+H(XJ) =
(K −M)L, as was to be shown.
B. Achievability for Theorem 1
In this section, we propose a PIR-PCSI–I protocol for
arbitrary K and M that achieves the rate (K − M)−1.
Throughout, we assume that q is sufficiently large, partic-
ularly q ≥ K . For arbitrary q < K , the achievability of
the rate (K − M)−1, which is not necessarily feasible, is
conditional on the existence of a (K,K − M) maximum-
distance-seperable (MDS) code over Fq that includes a
codeword with support S ∪W such that the ith codeword
symbol is ci for i ∈ S, and is non-zero for i = W .
Assume that q ≥ K , and let ω1, . . . , ωK be K distinct
elements from Fq.
Specialized GRS Code Protocol: This protocol consists
of four steps as follows:
Step 1: The user first constructs a polynomial
p(x) =
∑K−M−1
i=0 pix
i ,
∏
i6∈S∪W (x − ωi), and then
constructs K − M sequences Q1, . . . , QK−M , each of
length K , such that Qi = {v1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , vKω
i−1
K } for
i ∈ [K − M ], where vi =
ci
p(ωi)
for i ∈ S, and vi is a
randomly chosen element from F×q for i 6∈ S.
For any i ∈ [K −M ], the jth element, for any j ∈ K,
in the sequence Qi can be thought of as the entry (i, j)
of a (K −M) × K matrix G , [gT1 , . . . , g
T
K−M ]
T
, which
is the generator matrix of a (K,K − M) GRS code with
distinct parameters ω1, . . . , ωK and non-zero multipliers
v1, . . . , vK [13]. The construction above ensures that such
a GRS code has a specific codeword with support S ∪W ,
namely
∑K−M
i=1 pK−M−igi, where the ith codeword symbol
is ci for i ∈ S, and is non-zero for i =W .
Step 2: The user reorders Q1, . . . , QK−M by a randomly
chosen permutation σ : [K −M ]→ [K −M ], and sends the
query Q[W,S,C] = {Qσ−1(1), . . . , Qσ−1(K−M)} to the server.
Step 3: By using Qi, the server computes Ai =∑K
j=1 vjω
i−1
j Xj for all i ∈ [K − M ] where Qi =
{v1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , vKω
i−1
K }, and it sends the answer A
[W,S,C] =
{Aσ−1(1), . . . , Aσ−1(K−M)} to the user.
Note that Ai’s are the parity check equations of a (K,M)
GRS code which is the dual code of the GRS code generated
by the matrix G defined earlier.
Step 4: Upon receiving the answer, the user retrieves XW
by subtracting off the contribution of the side information
Y [S,C] from
∑K−M
i=1 pK−M−iAσ(i) = cWXW +
∑
i∈S ciXi.
Lemma 3. The Specialized GRS Code protocol is a PIR-
PCSI–I protocol, and achieves the rate (K −M)−1.
Proof: Since the matrix G, defined in Step 1 of the
protocol, generates a (K,K − M) GRS code which is
an MDS code, then the rows of G are linearly indepen-
dent, and accordingly, A1, . . . , AK−M are linearly indepen-
dent combinations of X1, . . . , XK , which are themselves
independently and uniformly distributed over Fqm . Thus,
A1, . . . , AK−M are independently and uniformly distributed
over Fqm . Since H(X1) = · · · = H(XK) = L, then
H(A1) = · · · = H(AK−M ) = L, and H(A[W,S,C]) =
H(A1, . . . , AK−M ) =
∑K−M
i=1 H(Ai) = (K − M)L for
any S ∈ S, any W 6∈ S, and any C ∈ C. Since
the joint distribution of W and S is uniform and C is
uniformly distributed, then H(A[W ,S,C]) = H(A[W,S,C]).
Thus, the Specialized GRS Code protocol has the rate
L/H(A[W ,S,C]) = L/H(A[W,S,C]) = (K −M)−1.
Next, we prove that the Specialized GRS Code protocol
is a PIR-PCSI–I protocol. It should be obvious from the
construction that the recoverability condition is satisfied.
The (W,S)-privacy condition is also satisfied because the
(K,K −M) GRS code, generated by the matrix G, is an
MDS code, and thereby, the minimum (Hamming) weight
of a codeword is K − (K −M) + 1 = M + 1, and there
are the same number of minimum-weight codewords for any
support of size M + 1 [13]. Thus, for any S ∈ S and any
W 6∈ S, the dual code, whose parity check matrix is given
by G, contains the same number of parity check equations
(with support S ∪W ) from each of which, given Y [S,C] for
some C ∈ C, XW can be recovered.
V. THE PIR-PCSI–II PROBLEM
A. Converse for Theorem 2
In this section, we give an information-theoretic proof of
converse for Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. For any 2 ≤M ≤ K , the scalar-linear capacity
of PIR-PCSI–II is upper bounded by (K −M + 1)−1.
Proof: Fix W , S, and C (and Y , Y [S,C]) such that
I [W,S] = 1. Let Q , Q[W,S,C] and A , A[W,S,C] be the
query and the answer of an arbitrary scalar-linear PIR-PCSI–
II protocol. We need to show that H(A) ≥ (K −M + 1)L.
Let I be the set of all j ∈ K such that H(Xj |A,Q) = 0,
i.e., Xj is recoverable from A (and Q) directly. Let XI ,
{Xj}j∈I . There are two cases: (i) I 6= ∅, and (ii) I = ∅.
Case (i): Since XI and Q are independent and
H(XI |A,Q) = 0 (by assumption), then
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q) +H(XI |A,Q)
= H(XI |Q) +H(A|Q,XI)
= H(XI) +H(A|Q,XI). (6)
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If |I|≥ K −M + 1, then H(XI) ≥ (K − M + 1)L,
and subsequently, H(A) ≥ (K − M + 1)L, as was to
be shown. If |I|≤ K − M , H(A|Q,XI) can be further
lower bounded as follows. Let n , |I|. Assume, w.l.o.g.,
that I = [n]. Let J , [K − M − n + 1], and Sj ,
{n+ 1, n+ j + 1, . . . , n+ j +M − 1} for j ∈ J . (Note
that |J |= K −M − n + 1.) By Lemma 1, for any j ∈ J ,
there exists Cj ∈ C (and accordingly, Yj , Y [Sj,Cj ]) such
that H(Xn+1|A,Q, Yj) = 0. Let Zj , Yj − cjXn+1 where
cj is the coefficient of Xn+1 in Yj . By the scalar-linearity
of A, it is easy to see that either H(Zj |A,Q) = 0 or
H(Zj + c
∗
jXn+1|A,Q) = 0 for some c
∗
j ∈ F
×
q \{cj}. (Other-
wise, the server learns that the user’s demand index and side
information index set cannot be n+ 1 and Sj , respectively.
This obviously violates the (W,S)-privacy condition.) Thus,
H(Zj |A,Q,Xn+1) = 0. Let ZJ , {Zj}j∈J . Then, we have
H(A|Q,XI) ≥ H(A|Q,XI , Xn+1)
= H(A|Q,XI , Xn+1)
+H(ZJ |A,Q,XI , Xn+1) (7)
= H(ZJ |Q,XI , Xn+1)
+H(A|Q,XI , Xn+1, ZJ)
≥ H(ZJ) (8)
where (7) holds since H(Zj|A,Q,Xn+1) = 0 for all
j ∈ J (by assumption); and (8) follows because ZJ is
independent of (Q,XI , Xn+1), noting that ZJ , XI , and
Xn+1 are linearly independent (by construction). By the
linear independence of Zj’s for all j ∈ J , it follows that
H(ZJ) = (K −M − n+ 1)L. By (6) and (8), we get
H(A) ≥ nL+ (K −M − n+ 1)L = (K −M + 1)L.
Case (ii): Assume, w.l.o.g., that W = 1 and S = [M ].
Let J , [K −M ], and Sj , {1, j + 2, . . . , j +M − 2} for
j ∈ J . (Note that |J |= K−M .) Similarly as in the case (i),
define Yj (and accordingly Zj) for all j ∈ J , where Xn+1
is replaced by X1. By using a similar argument as before, it
can be shown that H(Zj |A,Q,X1) = 0 for all j ∈ J . Let
ZJ , {Zj}j∈J . Then, we can write
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y )
= H(A|Q, Y ) +H(X1|A,Q, Y ) (9)
= H(X1|Q, Y ) +H(A|Q, Y,X1)
= H(X1) +H(A|Q, Y,X1)
+H(ZJ |A,Q, Y,X1) (10)
= H(X1) +H(ZJ |Q, Y,X1)
+H(A|Q, Y,X1, ZJ)
≥ H(X1) +H(ZJ ) (11)
where (9) follows since H(X1|A,Q, Y ) = 0 (by the recover-
ability condition); (10) holds because H(Zj |A,Q,X1) = 0,
and subsequently, H(Zj|A,Q, Y,X1) = 0, for all j ∈ J ;
and (11) follows because ZJ is independent of (Q, Y,X1)
(due to the linear independence of ZJ , Y , and X1). Since
|J |= K − M , we have H(ZJ ) = (K − M)L (noting
that Zj’s are linearly independent), and thereby, H(A) ≥
L+ (K −M)L = (K −M + 1)L.
B. Achievability for Theorem 2
In this section, we propose a PIR-PCSI–II protocol, which
is a slightly modified version of the Specialized GRS Code
protocol, that achieves the rate (K −M +1)−1 for arbitrary
K and M .
Modified Specialized GRS Code Protocol: This protocol
consists of four steps, where the steps 2-4 are the same as
those in the Specialized GRS Code protocol (Section IV-B),
except thatM is replaced withM−1 everywhere. The step 1
of the proposed protocol is as follows:
Step 1: The user first constructs a polynomial
p(x) =
∑K−M
i=0 pix
i ,
∏
i6∈S(x − ωi), and then constructs
K − M + 1 sequences Q1, . . . , QK−M+1, each of length
K , such that Qi = {v1ω
i−1
1 , . . . , vKω
i−1
K } for i ∈ [K−M ],
where vi =
ci
p(ωi)
for i ∈ S \W ; vW =
c
p(ωW )
where c is
chosen uniformly at random from F×q \ {cW }; and vi is a
randomly chosen element from F×q for i 6∈ S.
Lemma 5. The Modified Specialized GRS Code protocol is a
PIR-PCSI–II protocol, and achieves the rate (K−M+1)−1.
Proof: The proof, omitted to avoid repetition, follows
from the same lines as in the proof of Lemma 3 whereM is
replaced by M − 1, and W 6∈ S is replaced by W ∈ S.
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